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 Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to compare the sustainability reporting practices of family 
firms with those of their non-family counterparts and to examine the role of social 
visibility and reputation. The empirical analysis relies on the 84 firms controlled by 
one of the European billionaires listed in the Forbes’ 2015 World’s Billionaires 
Ranking. After controlling for several variables, our findings are consistent with the 
argument that family firms attach greater importance to sustainability reporting. 
However, we do not find evidence that within the family firms’ arena those with 
greatest exposure to reputational damage attribute greater importance to sustainability 
reporting. We do however find evidence that within firms that attach lower 
prominence to sustainability issues, family firms, especially those controlled by 
billionaires, are less likely to present detailed sustainability information in their 
websites, via autonomous sustainability reports.  
Key words: Sustainability Reporting, Family firms, Forbes, World’s Billionaires 
Ranking. 
 
  
1. Introduction  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is inextricably linked to the impacts the 
companies’ activities have on society. It implies that they consider “the impact of 
their actions on stakeholders in society, while simultaneously contributing to global 
sustainability” (Sarkar and Searcy 2016, p. 1433). Whilst defining it as companies’ 
responsibility for their impacts on society, the European Commission (2011) 
acknowledges the disclosure of non-financial information sustainability reporting, as 
an important cross-cutting issue. The recent requirement of publication of information 
pertaining to, namely, environmental, social and employee issues, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters, by major European entities, is a testimony 
of the importance of CSR reporting (Montecchia et al. 2016). This information is 
nowadays mostly disclosed through sustainability reporting, whether it would be by 
the way of websites, annual reports, or autonomous reports (ibid.).  
Although there is a burgeoning stream of research on CSR in a family firm 
setting (e.g. Aoi et al. 2015; Bingham et al. 2011; Bergamaschia et al. 2016; Berrone 
et al. 2010; Block and Wagner 2014a, 2014b; Cennamo et al. 2012; Cui et al. 2016; 
Déniz and Suárez 2005; El Ghoul et al. 2016; Lamb and Butler 2016; Hirigoyen and 
Poulain-Rehm 2014; Labelle et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2017; Marques et al. 2014; 
Martínez-Ferrero et al. 2016; Uhlaner et al. 2004; Van Gils et al. 2014; Yu et al. 2015; 
Zientara 2016), the topic of sustainability reporting in such a setting has been under-
researched. As far as the authors are aware, only a little over a handful of studies on 
sustainability reporting focusing on family firms has been published (Campopiano 
and De Massis 2015; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. 2015; Gavana et al. 2017; Iyer and 
Lulseged 2013; Nekhili et al. 2017). Such scarcity can indeed be considered as 
surprising in view of the ubiquity of these firms and their fundamental role in 
economies worldwide (Campopiano and De Massis 2015). These studies are all very 
recent and, with the exception of Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015), they have been 
conducted on a single-country setting. What is more, these studies focus on the 
comparison between family firms’ sustainability reporting with such reporting by 
their non-family counterparts. There is a noteworthy scarcity of evidence regarding 
sustainability reporting within the family business arena. Gavana et al. (2017), who 
examined the impact of the visibility of the firm on sustainability reporting, is the 
only of these studies exploring this latter issue. In this study, we examine whether the 
visibility of the family, rather than that the firm, is a factor influencing sustainability 
reporting by family firms. 
In the wake of Campopiano and De Massis (2015), one can distinguish two 
categories of empirical studies on sustainability reporting focusing on family firms: 
the first is based on samples exclusively composed of family firms; the second uses 
mixed samples of family and non-family firms and compare sustainability reporting 
between both types of firms. The purpose of this study is to contribute to this 
literature on sustainability reporting by family firms by comparing such reporting by 
family firms with that of non-family firms. In addition, in view of the lack of research 
on the differences that exist within the family firm arena (Bergamaschia and 
Randerson 2016), we also compare sustainability reporting between family firms 
controlled by European billionaires listed in the Forbes 2015 World’s billionaires 
Ranking and those without such type of control. This is done with the aim of studying 
the importance of reputation in influencing sustainability reporting by family firms, 
and we consider this as the major contribution of this study.  
Family business research acknowledges that two of the fundamental drivers of 
business decision in family firms are the perpetuation of the control of the family over 
the business and the safeguard of the firm’s reputation with stakeholders (Prencipe et 
al. 2014). Family firms’ reputation and social capital represent critical assets that have 
enduring economic effects on the business that these organizations endeavour to 
protect (ibid.). The owners of this type of firms are more likely to focus on firm 
survival and aim to keep long term control, and this is likely to entail the existence of 
long-term dealings between the same set of shareholders, managers and practices and 
external stakeholders (such as the case of customers, suppliers and lenders) (ibid.).  
Our study focuses on sustainability reporting through firms’ websites. The 
Internet has become the main tool of firms’ communication with their stakeholders 
“since it allows companies to publicise detailed and up-to-date information less 
expensively and faster than ever before” (Montechia et al. 2016, p. 44). This medium 
is nowadays “the preferred channel employed to reveal corporate identity, to manage 
external impressions and to legitimate companies’ behaviours towards stakeholders 
(Montechia et al. 2016, pp. 44-45). We examine the prominence of sustainability 
reporting in the website (section devoted to sustainability issues on the homepage) 
and the provision of sustainability reports.  
Based on a theoretical framework that views sustainability reporting as an 
instrument used by firms to legitimise their behaviours and influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions of their reputation, we expect that firms which present the greatest 
exposure to reputational damage will engage in higher levels of sustainability 
reporting to minimize unwanted scrutiny that could impair the firm’s reputation.  
The empirical analysis relies on the 84 firms controlled by one of the 
European billionaires listed in the Forbes’ 2015 World’s Billionaires Ranking. After 
controlling for several variables, our findings are consistent with the argument that 
family firms attach greater importance to sustainability reporting. However, we do not 
find evidence that within the family firms arena those with greatest exposure to 
reputational damage attribute greater importance to sustainability reporting. We do 
however find evidence that within firms that attach lower prominence to sustainability 
issues, family firms, especially those controlled by billionaires, are less likely to 
present detailed sustainability information in their websites, via autonomous 
sustainability report. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical 
framework used and develop the hypotheses. Thereafter follows a section presenting 
the research design. In section 4 we present the main findings. Finally, section 5 is 
devoted to the discussion of the findings and the offering of some concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework adopted in this study combines a theory that is 
gaining attention in explaining the CSR behaviour of family firms, the socio-
emotional wealth theory (Marques et al. 2014), with legitimacy theory. In contrast to 
lenses of analysis that see man as being motivated solely by economic considerations 
and suggest that those in a position of power and superior information will use it to 
exploit others, both these theories emphasise the importance of non-economic values 
in driving human behaviour.  
The socioemotional wealth theory has been developed specifically within the 
field of family business research (Prencipe et al. 2014). Deephouse and Jaskiewicz 
(2013, p. 340) view the concept of socioemotional wealth as summarizing “a family’s 
affective value gained from a firm”. It refers to goals common to the family members 
such as the intention to pass the business to the descendants, the provision of 
employment to the members of the family, and social status in the community (ibid.). 
As Lamb and Butler (2016, p. 9) put it, “socioemotional wealth is essentially the non-
economic utilities that the family owners receive from running their family firms”. 
This concept thus captures a set of “non-financial affect-related values” whose 
preservation deserves special attention within family firms (Prencipe et al. 2014, p. 
366). These values include the following: “fulfilment of the needs for belonging, 
affect, and intimacy; identification of the family with the firm; desire to exercise 
authority and to retain influence and control within the firm; continuation of family 
values through the firm; preservation of family firm social capital and the family 
dynasty; discharge of familial obligations; and the capacity to act altruistically 
towards family members using firm resources.” (ibid.) 
Legitimacy theory is one of the more established theoretical lenses of analysis 
in the sustainability-reporting field of research (Branco and Rodrigues 2008; Deegan 
2002; Gavana et al. 2017; Hoogiemstra 2000; Michelon 2011; Michelon et al. 2015; 
Milne and Patten 2002; Montechia et al. 2016; Patten 1991; Patten 1992; Patten and 
Crampton 2004; Pellegrino and Lodhia 2012). It has been the dominant theoretical 
framework in examining the disclosure of social and environmental information as 
part of the social and environmental accounting literature (Crane and Glozer 2016). In 
spite of the noticeable “proliferation of theoretical perspectives”, the purpose of 
achieving legitimacy is commonly acknowledged by scholars as a primary one “that 
encourages and motivates companies to disclose social and environmental 
information” (Montechia et al. 2016, p. 44).  
The most cited and probably most popular definition of legitimacy has been 
offered by Suchman (1995 p. 574), according to whom legitimacy is “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.” Suchman notes that “legitimacy management rests heavily on 
communication” (Suchman 1995, p. 586). The legitimacy theory lens of analysis 
allows to explain CSR and the reporting thereof by reference to notion that a firm 
should behave in accordance to what society views as socially acceptable and has to 
communicate such behaviour.  
Being an outcome that leads to the enhancement of affective value to family 
members, a favourable reputation of the family firm is likely to be a major 
socioemotional wealth goal (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz 2013). Many studies adopting 
a legitimacy theory perspective analyse reputation as a determinant of sustainability 
reporting (Branco and Rodrigues 2008; Bebbington et al. 2008; Branco and Rodrigues 
2008; Michelon 2011). Branco and Rodrigues (2008, p. 287) see reputation and 
legitimacy as two inextricably linked notions, in the sense that the latter “requires a 
reputation that must be retained”.  
 
3. Relevant literature and hypothesis development 
The few studies comparing sustainability reporting practices between family 
and non-family firms present mixed evidence. Whereas Iyer and Lulseged (2013) and 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) found no evidence of any difference between the 
two types of firms in terms of their sustainability reporting, the findings of 
Campopiano and De Massis (2015), Nekhili et al. (2017) and Gavana et al. (2017) 
suggest that such difference does exist.  
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) is the only of these studies using and 
international sample (composed of 575 non-financial listed companies from 13 
countries for the period 2003-2009). They examined sustainability in family 
businesses, as well as the specific role of independent directors in this regard. They 
found no statistically significant difference between family firms’ sustainability 
reporting compared to similar practices by their non-family counterparts.  
Iyer and Lulseged (2013) examined the association between the family status 
and sustainability reporting of large S&P 500 US companies and found no statistically 
significant difference in the likelihood of sustainability reporting between family and 
non-family firms. Nekhili et al. (2017) used a sample of 91 of the 120 largest publicly 
traded firms in France for the period 2001-2010. They examined the moderating role 
of family involvement in the relationship between sustainability reporting and firm 
market value. Their findings suggest that family firms report less information 
pertaining to sustainability issues than their non-family counterparts. However, the 
relation between market-based financial performance and sustainability reporting was 
found to be positive in the case of family firms and negative non-family firms. 
Campopiano and De Massis (2015) analysed sustainability reporting of 98 
large- and medium-sized listed Italian firms. Their findings revealed that when 
compared to their non-family counterparts family firms disseminate a greater variety 
of reports, are less compliant with CSR standards and place emphasis on different 
CSR topics. Acknowledging the higher concern of family firms with reputation and 
legitimacy when compared to their non-family counterparts, Gavana et al. (2017b) 
used a sample of 230 Italian non-financial listed firms for the period 2004-2013. They 
examined whether family firms are more sensitive to social visibility than their non-
family counterparts and also whether more visible family firms are more sensitive to 
such visibility than the less visible counterparts. They analysed the interaction 
between family ownership with a proxy for social visibility, media exposure 
(measured by the number of containing the firm’s name), and found that such 
interaction to be significantly positive. They concluded that social visibility reinforces 
family firms propensity to disclose sustainability information and that such firms are 
more sensitive to media exposure than their non-family counterparts.  
In this study, we examine whether the visibility of the family, rather than that 
the firm, is a factor influencing sustainability reporting by family firms. We assess the 
controlling family’s visibility by considering that firms controlled by one of the 
European billionaires listed in 2015 World’s Billionaires Ranking, compiled and 
published by the American business magazine Forbes, are more visible than firms 
included in a matched sample of family and non-family firms based on size and 
country.  
When compared their non-family counterparts, family firms have an additional 
specific stakeholder, the family itself (Déniz and Suaréz 2005; Zellweger and Nason 
2008). This entails some interesting consequences from the point of view of 
stakeholder relations and its management. First, relationships with this particular 
stakeholder are significantly influenced by trust and emotions (Déniz and Suaréz 
2005). Second, in this type of firms there is likely to exist an enhanced incentive to 
make sure that stakeholders are satisfied because of the manifold stakeholder roles 
often played by individuals in family firms (e.g., employee, family member, owner, 
manager) (Zellweger and Nason 2008). Given that leaders are either members of the 
family or possess emotional links to it, in family firms altruistic measures taken for 
the interest of the organization and its stakeholders may prevail (Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller 2006). 
Family businesses seem to have a longer-term perspective than other 
organizations that may be explained by an interest in benefitting future generations of 
the family through the business as opposed to investors or markets (Davis et al. 2010). 
Family shareholders view their ownership as an asset to pass on to their heirs, rather 
than wealth to consume during their lifetimes (Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson and 
Reeb 2003). Given that family firms are less likely to experience the same pressures 
to meet expectations from shareholders as other firms, it is likely that their managers 
recognize the importance of other stakeholder groups and satisfy multiple 
stakeholders.  
A fundamental aspect to consider pertains to the importance of firm and 
family reputation to family shareholders (Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson and Reeb 
2003; Prencipe et al. 2014; Zellweger and Nason, 2008). Given the strong identity 
overlap between individual, family, and firm reputation, the reputation of the family 
firm will often be regarded as an individual and family reputation (and vice versa), 
and it will be seen as creating value for the individual, the family, and the firm at the 
same time (Zellweger and Nason 2008). Hence, the family endeavours to create a 
distinctive image and to obtain a good reputation, not only because of its relevance to 
the business success but also, and probably mainly, because of its relevance in terms 
of family interest and social status (Sageder et al. 2016). 
Many see reputation as a determinant of sustainability reporting (Branco and 
Rodrigues 2008; Toms 2002; Hasseldine et al. 2005; Bebbington et al. 2008; Branco 
and Rodrigues 2008; Michelon 2011). According to Branco and Rodrigues (2008, p. 
686), companies disclose sustainability information “mainly to present a socially 
responsible image so that they can legitimise their behaviours to stakeholder groups 
and influence the external perception of reputation.”  
According to Cruz et al. (2014, p. 1299), given that the identity of the family 
members is so inextricably linked to the firm that its stakeholders perceive it as an 
extension of the family itself, family members are especially careful about the image 
they project to external stakeholders. As a result, family firms are expected to be more 
willing to engage in socially responsible practices that lead to the enhancement of 
their reputation and legitimacy (Cennamo et al. 2012; Cruz et al. 2014). Concurrently, 
as emphasised by the proponents the socio-emotional wealth theory, given that family 
members are not faceless owners, they are more exposed to losses of socioemotional 
wealth as a result of socially irresponsible actions when compared to other types of 
owners (Berrone et al., 2010; Cruz et al. 2014).  
Thus, to protect their socioemotional wealth, family owners are more likely to 
engage in socially responsible practices to obtain, enhance and protect both the family 
and the firm’s reputation and legitimacy. On the other hand, family owners that, in 
view of their own and their firm visibility, are more exposed to reputational damage 
and are more likely to experience socioemotional wealth losses or to experience 
higher levels of such losses, are more likely to engage in socially responsible 
practices to obtain, enhance and protect their and their firm’s reputation and 
legitimacy. 
Based on the above, we propose the two following hypotheses:  
H1: Family firms are more likely to place sustainability information in more 
prominent sections of their web sites and to provide sustainability reports than non-
family firms.  
H2: Family firms controlled by more visible families are more likely to place 
sustainability information in more prominent sections of their web sites and provide 
sustainability reports than less visible family firms.  
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Sample 
The empirical study relies on the 2015 World’s Billionaires Ranking, 
compiled and published by the American business magazine Forbes. This ranking is 
published every year since 1987. In 2015, there was a record of 1.826 people on the 
list, with an average net worth coming in at 3.86 billion USD and a total net worth of 
7.1 trillion USD. 
We started by identifying the European’s richest people included in the 2015 
World’s billionaires Ranking. We focus on the European setting in order to guaranty 
the homogeneity of the sample. Then, we identified the firms controlled by these 
billionaires but that are listed on a stock exchange and whose website is available in 
English. Our sample comprises 84 firms controlled by one of the European 
billionaires listed in the Forbes ranking (Family Forbes firms). 
Given that the purpose of this study is to analyse the sustainability reporting 
practices of the firms controlled by the European’s richest billionaires, when 
compared to other family firms and to non-family firms, our sample includes a 
matched sample based on size and country. For each firm controlled by a billionaire, 
we selected the two most similar firms, in terms of size, from the same country and 
providing information in English in their website. 
In order to ensure that our results are not sensitive to outliers, the observations 
whose absolute value of the standardized residuals is greater than 2 were excluded 
from the sample. The final sample is thus composed of 256 firms from 16 European 
countries.  
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by country and by type of firm. The 
most represented countries are France, Italy, Russia and Germany, with 45, 38, 30 and 
27 firms, respectively. The least represented countries are Austria, Denmark and 
Switzerland. In general terms, about 60% of the firms included in the sample are 
family firms and about half of them are firms controlled by a billionaire included in 
the Forbes list. 
 
Table 1 
 
4.2. Variables 
This study compares sustainability reporting practices between family firms 
controlled by a billionaire included in the Forbes list, other family firms and non-
family firms. Two measures of sustainability reporting practices are used. The first 
measures the prominence attributed to this issue, through the classification of the 
firms into two groups, those that present in the main menu of its website a link named 
corporate sustainability (or similar) and those that do not adopt such procedure. In 
this, we follow Chaudhri and Wang (2007), Guziana and Dobers (2013) and Branco et 
al. (2014), who consider that the existence of a primary link to sustainability-related 
matters in the homepage is evidence of the recognizance of the necessity and import 
of prominent presentation of a company’s engagement with sustainable development. 
Thus, the first dependent variable used in this study (LINK) is a binary variable that 
assumes the value 1 if the firm presents this link in the main menu and 0 otherwise. 
We found that almost all the firms that have in the main menu of their website 
a link named corporate sustainability (or similar) also provide sustainability reports 
(or similar) available for download, which is not the case in the group of firms that 
do not have this link, in which only some firms provide sustainability reports. A 
second analysis is then carried out considering only the group of firms that do not 
present any link named corporate sustainability (or similar) in the main menu of their 
website. These firms are classified in two groups, those that make available in any 
part of its website at least the 2014 sustainability report (or similar) and those that do 
not adopt this procedure. Thus, the second dependent variable used in this study 
(RELAT) is a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm makes the 
sustainability report (or similar) available on its website and 0 otherwise. 
The website of the firms included in the sample was analyzed in order to 
construct the two dependent variables used in this study (LINK and RELAT). This 
analysis occurred in January, February and March 2016. 
In order to compare the reporting practices on sustainability matters between 
family and non-family firms, we split the sample into two groups giving rise to one 
of the main independent variables used in this study (FAMILY), a binary variable 
that assumes 1 if the firm is classified as a family firm and 0 otherwise. We classify a 
firm as a family firm when there is an individual or a family that holds more than 
50% of the shares or, holding a lower stake, performs functions in the top 
management, that is, serves as chairman and/or as chief executive officer. The 
information about the ownership structure of each firm was collected from the 
corporate governance reports presented on the firms’ websites. 
In order to analyse whether the reporting practices of the family firms differ, 
depending on whether they are controlled or not by a billionaire included in the 
Forbes list, we use a second main independent variable (FAMILY_Forbes) that 
assumes 1 if the firm is controlled by a billionaire included in the Forbes list and 0 
otherwise. 
Additional independent variables are also used as a way of control for 
alternative explanations of sustainability reporting practices, namely, the firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), growth rate (GROWTH) and board 
characteristics (BOARD). The data used to compute these variables is collected from 
the Worldscope database, except for the variable BOARD whose information is 
collected from the corporate governance reports presented on the firms’ websites. 
Table 2 presents detailed information regarding each one of the variables used in this 
study.   
 
Table 2 
 
4.3. Models 
With the aim of comparing the sustainability reporting practices among family 
firms controlled by a billionaire that integrates the Forbes list, other family firms and 
non-family firms, we perform two types of analysis. First, we apply the logistic 
regression model (1) to the entire sample, and use as dependent variable a measure of 
the prominence that the entities give to the issue of sustainability in their websites. 
The dependent variable (LINK) is thus a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if 
the firm presents in the main menu of its website a link named corporate sustainability 
(or similar) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Modelo 1 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐾𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑠2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸3 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉4 + 𝛽5 ∗
𝑅𝑂𝐴5 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻6 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷7 + 𝜀𝑖         (1) 
 
The main independent variables used in this model are the variables FAMILY 
and FAMILY_Forbes variables. If family firms are more likely to display a link 
named corporate sustainability (or similar) in the main menu of their website, the 
coefficient 𝜷𝟏 will be positive and statistically significant. If this probability is even 
higher in the group of family firms that are controlled by a billionaire included in the 
Forbes list, the coefficient 𝜷𝟐will also be positive and statistically significant.  
Second, we apply the logistic regression model (2) to the sub-sample of firms 
that do not present any link named corporate sustainability (or similar) in the main 
menu of their website, and use as dependent variable the likelihood of firms providing 
the sustainability report (or similar) somewhere on their website. The dependent 
variable (RELAT) is thus a binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm makes 
the sustainability report (or similar) available on its website and 0 otherwise. 
 
Model 2 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑠2 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸3 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉4 + 𝛽5 ∗
𝑅𝑂𝐴5 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻6 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷7 + 𝜀𝑖       (2) 
 
The independent variables used in model (2) are identical to those used in 
model (1) and both models are estimated with industry and country fixed effects. 
 5. Findings 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
study, considering the entire sample and each of the sub-samples analysed.  
 
Table 3 
 
Overall, we find that about half of the firms (48.4%) present in the main menu 
of their website a link named corporate sustainability (or similar). When analysing 
the sub-samples of firms, we find that the presence of this link is more evident in the 
sub-group of family firms controlled by a billionaire included in the Forbes list (with 
57.1%), and is less evidenced in the sub-group of non-family firms (with 40.0%).  
Regarding the variable RELAT, it refers only to the firms with no link to 
sustainability issues in the homepage. Even without presenting such link, 54% of the 
non-family firms provide a sustainability report (or similar), a proportion that is 
higher than on the cases of family-firms (40,3%) and family firms controlled by 
billionaires (29,8%). That the subgroup of family firms controlled by billionaires 
present the highest proportion of firms presenting a link to sustainability issues in the 
homepage (57,1%) and the lowest proportion of firms without such a link providing a 
sustainability report in the website (29,8%).  
Regarding the independent variables, we find that SIZE and GROWTH have 
a mean value of 15,052 and 7.603, respectively, and there are no statistically 
significant differences among the three sub-samples of firms. The LEV and the ROA 
have a mean value of 28.4% and 4.4%, respectively. The LEV is significantly smaller, 
and the ROA is significantly higher, in the sub-sample of family firms controlled by a 
billionaire included in the Forbes list, when compared to the other sub-samples of 
firms. We also find that in 26% of the firms, the role of chairman and chief executive 
officer is performance by the same person, and this percentage is significantly lower 
in in the sub-samples of family firms, when compared to the non-family firms.  
 
5.2. Regressions results 
Table 4 presents the results of the OLS regression for the model (1), which 
comprises the entire sample. The results presented in the column C1 allow us to 
compare the reporting practices on sustainability among family and non-family firms. 
With the column C2, we further examines whether the family firms controlled by a 
billionaire that is included in the Forbes list are distinguished from the other family 
firms. 
 
Table 4 
 
The dependent variable (LINK) is an indicator that assumes 1 if the firm 
presents in the main menu of its website a link named sustainability (or similar) and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient of the variable FAMILY is positive and statistically 
significant (both in C1 and C2), which indicates that the probability of presenting a 
link named sustainability (or similar) in the main menu of the website is significantly 
higher for family firms, as compared to non-family firms.  
However, the coefficient of the variable FAMILY_Forbes (in C2) is not 
statistically significant, which indicates that there are no statistically significant 
differences in the presence or absence of a link to sustainability in the main menu of 
the firms’ websites among firms controlled by a billionaire that is included in the 
Forbes list and other family firms. It is thus evident that it is not the fact that the a 
firm is controlled by a billionaire that causes it to demonstrate on its website a greater 
concern with sustainability issues, but rather the fact that this control is done by a 
family. 
Regarding the control variables, we find that the coefficient of the variable 
SIZE is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the larger the firm, 
the greater the probability that it will present a link named sustainability (or similar) 
in the main menu of its website. The coefficient of the variable GROWTH is also 
statistically significant but has a negative sign. Finally, the coefficients of the 
variables LEV, ROA e BOARD are not statistically significant.  
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS regression for the model (2), which 
comprises only the sub-sample of firms that do not present any link named corporate 
sustainability (or similar) in the main menu of their website. The results presented in 
the column C1 allow us to compare the reporting practices on sustainability among 
family and non-family firms. With the column C2, we further examines whether the 
family firms controlled by a billionaire that are included in the Forbes list are 
distinguished from the other family firms. 
 
Table 5 
 
The dependent variable (RELAT) is an indicator that assumes 1 if the firm 
makes the 2014 sustainability report (or similar) available on its website and 0 
otherwise if the firm. Contrary to what happened with the analysis of the model (1), 
the analysis of the model (2) shows that the coefficient of the variable FAMILY is 
negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the probability of firms 
without a sustainability link (or similar) in the main menu of their website to present a 
sustainability report (or similar) is smaller in in the group of family firms as compared 
to non-family firms.  
We also find the coefficient of the variable FAMILY_Forbes (in C2) is 
negative and statistically significant, which indicates that the probability of presenting 
a sustainability report (or similar) is even smaller in the group of family firms 
controlled by a billionaire that is included in the Forbes list. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
This study compares sustainability reporting between family firms which are 
expected to lose more from not having a solid reputation of being socially responsible 
with a matched sample of family firms regarding which there is no such expectation, 
as well as with non-family firms. It is based on a lens of analysis that, using insights 
from socioemotional wealth and legitimacy theories, approaches sustainability 
reporting as an instrument used by firms to legitimise their behaviours and influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions of their reputation. Among family firms, we expected that 
those which present the greatest exposure to reputational damage, because of their 
social visibility, will engage in higher levels of sustainability reporting to minimize 
unwanted scrutiny that could impair the firm’s reputation. We suggested that family 
firms would have significant reputation costs concerns and sustainability reporting 
could be deemed as an instrument used to promote trust from their stakeholders. 
Contrary to previous research exploring the influence of social visibility on 
sustainability reporting (Gavana et al. 2017), which focused on the visibility of the 
firm, we examine whether the visibility of the family is a factor influencing 
sustainability reporting by family firms. 
After controlling for several variables, our findings are consistent with the 
argument that family firms attach greater importance to sustainability reporting. 
However, we do not find evidence that within the family firms’ arena those with 
greatest exposure to reputational damage attribute greater importance to sustainability 
reporting. We do however find evidence that within firms that attach lower 
prominence to sustainability issues, family firms, especially those controlled by 
billionaires, are less likely to present detailed sustainability information in their 
websites, via autonomous sustainability reports. The general findings that family 
firms attach greater importance to sustainability reporting is consistent with our 
expectation and with the findings of Campopiano and De Massis (2015). These 
authors found that family firms placed more emphasis on creating a website section 
dedicated to sustainability issues, were more likely to establish foundations and more 
inclined to publish additional sustainability related reports, such as environmental 
reports. They consider that these findings “can be interpreted in light of the greater 
importance that family firms attach to the actions that affect their reputation and that 
foster dialogue with their external stakeholders.” (Campopiano and De Massis, 2015, 
p. 518) Moreover, explicit reporting initiatives such as these “reflect the typically 
higher attention paid by family firms” to the enhancement of their visibility and 
family reputation and to the augmentation of their legitimacy in society (Campopiano 
and de Massis, 2015, p. 528). Family firms do seem to be more concerned with their 
reputation, in particular with their reputation of being socially responsible. We have 
not found evidence that family firms controlled by highly visible billionaires attach 
more importance to sustainability reporting than family firms that are not controlled 
by such individuals. This is not consistent with the findings of Gavana et al. (2017), 
which imply that social visibility reinforces family firms propensity to disclose 
sustainability information. However, whereas Gavana et al. (2017) examine the firm’s 
social visibility, we consider the family’s social visibility. It may be the case that the 
visibility of the family is not as important as the visibility of the firm.  
In the arena of firms that seem to attribute lesser import to having a reputation 
for being socially responsible (those that do not have a link to sustainability issues in 
the homepage), family firms, in particular those controlled by a billionaire, are less 
preoccupied with offering detailed information on their CSR practices (by way of 
providing a sustainability report). This is not consistent with our expectations. We 
consider the argument presented by Campopiano and de Massis to explain the lower 
propensity towards compliance with CSR standards presented by family firms when 
compared to their non-family counterparts. According to these authors, given that 
compliance with such standards entail satisfying requirements in a relatively passive 
manner to obtain a label of compliance with institutional norms and rules, this finding 
may be interpreted in the light of the more autonomous nature of family firms and 
lower dependence on the institutional context (Campopiano and de Massis, 2015, p. 
528). This is likely to make even more sense in the case of family firms controlled by 
billionaires, who, given they wealth, are more likely to have great autonomy and low 
dependence on the institutional context.  
This study presents some obvious limitations related to the sample: it is of 
small size; it composed only of large companies. Another limitation is related to the 
data capture method which obviously has implications on the conclusions. Possible 
extensions to this study are related to the use of a larger sample of companies 
including smaller companies. Another interesting avenue for further research is to use 
more refined content analysis methods.  
 
References 
Anderson, R., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328. 
Anderson, R., Mansi, S., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and the 
agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263-285. 
Aoi, M., Asaba, S., Kubota, K., & Takehara, H. (2015). Family firms, firm 
characteristics, and corporate social performance. Journal of Family Business 
Management, 5(2), 192- 217 
Bebbington, J., Larrinaga-González, C., & Moneva, J. M. (2008). Corporate social 
responsibility and reputation risk management. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 21(3), 337-362.  
Bergamaschia, M., & Randerson, K. (2016). The futures of family businesses and the 
development of corporate social responsibility. Futures, 75, 54-65.  
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gómez-Mejía, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). 
Socioemotional wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: Do family-
controlled firms pollute less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), 82–113.  
Bingham, J. B., Dyer, W. G, Jr, Smith, I., & Adams, G. L. (2011). A Stakeholder 
identity orientation approach to corporate social performance in family firms. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 99(4), 565–585.  
Block, J. H., & Wagner, D. (2014a). Ownership versus management effects on 
corporate social responsibility concerns in large family and founder firms. Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, 5(4), 339-346.  
Block, J. H., & Wagner, D. (2014b). The Effect of Family Ownership on Different 
Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Large US Firms. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 23, 475-492.  
Branco, M. C., & Rodrigues, L. L. (2008). Factors Influencing Social Responsibility 
Disclosure by Portuguese Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 685-701.  
Branco, M. C., Delgado, C., Sá, M., & Sousa, C. (2014). Comparing CSR 
communication on corporate websites in Sweden and Spain. Baltic Journal of 
Management, 9, (2), 231-250.  
Campopiano, G., & De Massis, A. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting: 
A Content Analysis in Family and Non-family Firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 129, 
511-534.  
Cennamo, C., Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gómez-Mejía, L.R. (2012). Socioemotional 
wealth and proactive stakeholder engagement: Why family controlled firms care more 
about their stakeholders. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 36(6), 1153-1173. 
Chaudhri, V., & Wang, J. (2007). Communicating corporate social responsibility on 
the Internet: A case study of the top 100 information technology companies in India. 
Management Communication Quarterly, 21(2), 232-247. 
Crane, A., & Glozer, S. (2016). Researching Corporate Social Responsibility 
Communication: Themes, Opportunities and Challenges. Journal of Management 
Studies, 53(7), 1223-1252. 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2015). The 
role of independent directors at family firms in relation to corporate social 
responsibility disclosures. International Business Review, 24(5), 890-901.  
Cui, V., Ding, S., Liu, M., & Wu, Z. (2016). Revisiting the Effect of Family 
Involvement on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Behavioral Agency Perspective. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 2016, forthcoming. 
Davis, J. H., Allen, M. R., & Hayes, H. D. (2010). Is Blood Thicker Than Water? A 
Study of Stewardship Perceptions in Family Business. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 34(6), 1093-1116. 
Deegan, C. (2002). The legitimising effect of social and environmental disclosures – a 
theoretical foundation. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(3), 282-
311. 
Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. (2013). Do Family Firms Have Better Reputations 
Than Non-Family Firms? An Integration of Socioemotional Wealth and Social 
Identity Theories. Journal of Management Studies, 50(3), 337-360.  
Déniz, M. C. D., & Suárez, M. K. C. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Family Business in Spain. Journal of Business Ethics, 56, 27-41.  
El Ghoul, S. Guedhami, H., Wang, H., & Kwok, C. C. Y. (2016). Family control and 
corporate social responsibility. Journal of Banking and Finance, 73, 131–146. 
European Commission (2011). A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for corporate social 
responsibility. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Com. 681 final, 6. 
Gavana, G., Gottardo, P., & Moisello, A. M. (2017). Sustainability Reporting in 
Family Firms: A Panel Data Analysis. Sustainability, 9(38). 
Guziana, B., & Dobers, P. (2013). How Sustainability Leaders Communicate 
Corporate Activities of Sustainable Development. Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, 20, 193-204.  
Hasseldine, J., Salama, A. I., & Toms, J. S. (2005). Quantity versus quality: the 
impact of environmental disclosures on the reputations of UK Plcs. The British 
Accounting Review, 37(2), 231-248. 
Hirigoyen, G., & Poulain-Rehm, T. (2014). The Corporate Social Responsibility of 
Family Businesses: An International Approach. International Journal of Financial 
Studies, 2, 240-265.  
Hoogiemstra, R. (2000). Corporate Communication and Impression Management – 
New Perspectives Why Companies Engage in Corporate Social Reporting. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 27(1/2), 55-68. 
Iyer, V. & Lulseged, A. (2013). Does family status impact US firms' sustainability 
reporting? Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 4(2), 163-189.  
Labelle, R., Hafsi, T., Francoeur, C., & Ben Amar, W. (2016). Family Firms’ 
Corporate Social Performance: A Calculated Quest for Socioemotional Wealth. 
Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming. 
Lamb, N. H., & Butler, F. C. (2016). The Influence of Family Firms and Institutional 
Owners on Corporate Social Responsibility Performance. Business and Society, 
forthcoming.  
Liu, M., Shi, Y., Wilson, C. & Wu, Z. (2017). Does family involvement explain why 
corporate social responsibility affects earnings management? Journal of Business 
Research, 75, 8-16.  
Marques, P., Presas, P., & Simon, A. (2014). The Heterogeneity of Family Firms in 
CSR Engagement: The Role of Values. Family Business Review, 27(3), 206-227.  
Martínez-Ferrero, J., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2016). Corporate 
social responsibility as an entrenchment strategy, with a focus on the implications of 
family ownership. Journal of Cleaner Production, 135, 760-770.  
Michelon, G. (2011). Sustainability disclosure and reputation: a comparative study. 
Corporate Reputation Review, 14(2), 79-96. 
Michelon, G., Pilonato, S., & Ricceri, F. (2015). CSR reporting practices and the 
quality of disclosure: an empirical analysis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 33, 
59-78. 
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: 
Agency, stewardship and capabilities. Family Business Review, 19. 73-87. 
Milne, M. J., & Patten, D. M. (2002). Securing organizational legitimacy: An 
experimental decision case examining the impact of environmental disclosures. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 15(3), 372-405. 
Montecchia, A., Giordano, F., & Grieco, C. (2016). Communicating CSR: integrated 
approach or Selfie? Evidence from the Milan Stock Exchange. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 136, 42-52. 
Nekhili, M., Nagati, H., Chtioui, T., & Rebolledo, C. (2017). Corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and market value: Family versus nonfamily firms. Journal of 
Business Research, 77, 41-52.  
Patten, D. M. (1991). Exposure, legitimacy, and social disclosure. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 10(4), 297-308. 
Patten, D. M. (1992). Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the 
Alaskan oil spill: a note on legitimacy theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
17(5), 471-475.  
Patten, D. M. (2002). Give or take on the Internet: An examination of the disclosure 
practices of insurance firm web innovators. Journal of Business Ethics, 36(3), 247-
259. 
Patten, D. M., & Crampton, W. (2004). Legitimacy and the Internet: An examination 
of corporate web page environmental disclosures. Advances in Environmental 
Accounting and Management, 2, 31-57. 
Pellegrino, C., & Lodhia, S. (2012). Climate change accounting and the Australian 
mining industry: exploring the links between corporate disclosure and the generation 
of legitimacy. Journal of Cleaner Production, 36, 68-82.  
Prencipe, A., Bar-Yosef, S., & Dekker, H. C. (2014). Accounting Research in Family 
Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges. European Accounting Review, 23(3), 
361-385.  
Sageder, M., Mitter, C., & Feldbauer‐Durstmüller, B. (2016). Image and reputation of 
family firms: a systematic literature review of the state of research. Review of 
Managerial Science, forthcoming.  
Sarkar, S., & Searcy, C. (2016). Zeitgeist or chameleon? A quantitative analysis of 
CSR definitions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 135, 1423-1435. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610. 
Toms, J. S. (2002). Company resources, quality signals and the determinants of 
corporate environmental reputation: some UK evidence. The British Accounting 
Review, 34(3), 257-282. 
Uhlaner, L. M., van Goor‐Balk, H. J. M., & Masurel, E. (2004). Family business and 
corporate social responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms. Journal of Small Business 
and Enterprise Development, 11(2), 186-194.  
Van Gils, A., Dibrell, C., Neubaum, D. O., & Craig, J. B. (2014). Social Issues in the 
Family Enterprise. Family Business Review, 27(3), 193-205.  
Yu, A., Ding, H.-B., & Chung, H.-M. (2015). Corporate social responsibility 
performance in family and non-family firms: The perspective of socio-emotional 
wealth. Asian Business & Management, 14(5), 383-412.  
Zellweger, T., & Nason, R. (2008). A stakeholder perspective to family firm 
performance. Family Business Review, 21(3), 203-216. 
Zientara, P. (2016). Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Critical Analysis. Journal of Business Ethics, forthcoming.  
 
  
 Table 1. Sample distribution by country and by type of firm 
 Family 
Forbes 
Family  
non-Forbes 
Non-Family Total 
Austria 0 1 1 2 
Denmark 1 1 0 2 
Finland 1 1 3 5 
France 15 9 21 45 
Germany 9 5 13 27 
Italy 13 22 3 38 
Netherlands 3 0 5 8 
Norway 2 1 3 6 
Poland 3 1 7 11 
Portugal 3 2 3 8 
Russia 9 18 3 30 
Spain 5 1 10 16 
Sweden 6 1 8 15 
Switzerland 1 1 1 3 
Turkey 8 8 7 23 
United Kingdom 5 0 12 17 
Total 84 72 100 256 
 
  
 Table 2 - Variables 
Name Lable Measurement 
LINK  Link on sustainability in the 
main menu of the firm website 
Assumes 1 if the firm presents in 
the main menu of its website a link 
named corporate sustainability (or 
similar) and 0 otherwise. 
RELAT Sustainability report presented 
in the firm website 
Assumes 1 if the firm makes the 
2014 sustainability report (or 
similar) available on its website and 
0 otherwise. 
FAMILY Family firm Assumes 1 if the firm is classified as 
family firm and 0 otherwise.  
FAMILY_Forbes Family firm controlled by a 
billionaire included in the 
Forbes list 
Assumes 1 if the firm is controlled 
by a billionaire that is included in the 
Forbes list and 0 otherwise.  
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEV Firm leverage Total liabilities divided by total 
assets.  
ROA Firm Return on assets  Net income divided by total assets. 
GROWTH Firm growth rate  Average change in revenue in the 
last 5 years. 
BOARD Board characteristic Assumes 1 if the role of chairman 
and the chief executive officer is 
performed by the same person and 0 
otherwise. 
 
  
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median STD 
All firms (N=256)    
  LINK 0,484 - - 
  RELAT 0,422 - - 
  SIZE 15,052 14,917 1,324 
  LEV 0,284 0,278 0,169 
  ROA 0,044 0,036 0,068 
  GROWTH 7,603 7,300 10,093 
  BOARD 0,260 - - 
Family firms – Forbes (N=84)    
  LINK 0,571 - - 
  RELAT 0,298 - - 
  SIZE 15.168 15.113 1.349 
  LEV 0.248 0.262 0.159 
  ROA 0.068 0.056 0.077 
  GROWTH 8.531 8.910 9.144 
  BOARD 0.240 - - 
Family firms - Non Forbes (N=72)    
  LINK 0,500 - - 
  RELAT 0,403 - - 
  SIZE 14.883 14.554 1.247 
  LEV 0.322 0.293 0.170 
  ROA 0.029 0.026 0.065 
  GROWTH 8.440 7.760 10.316 
  BOARD 0.240 - - 
Non-family firms (N=100)    
  LINK 0,400 - - 
  RELAT 0,540 - - 
  SIZE 15.077 14.936 1.358 
  LEV 0.287 0.294 0.173 
  ROA 0.036 0.029 0.056 
  GROWTH 6.222 5.900 10.622 
  BOARD 0.300 - - 
Table 4 – Regression results (Model 1) 
 C1 C2 
Constant -6.245*** -6.206*** 
FAMILY 1.002*** 0.973*** 
FAMILY_Forbes - 0.055 
SIZE 0.314*** 0.311*** 
LEV 0.884 0.896 
ROA -0.661 -0.740 
GROWTH -0.031* -0.031* 
BOARD 0.280 0.279 
INDUSTRY   
   Basic Materials 2.695*** 2.689*** 
   Oil and Gas 1.806*** 1.808*** 
   Telecommunications 1.850** 1.847** 
   Consumer Services 1.238*** 1.228*** 
COUNTRY   
   Spain 1.841*** 1.837*** 
   Sweden 1.530** 1.522** 
   
LR statistic 0.309*** 0.310*** 
McFadden R2 0.232 0.232 
The model is estimated with industry and country fixed effects. Statistically significant coefficients are presented. 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 Table 5 – Regression results (Model 2) 
 C1 C2 
Constant -8.434** -8.840** 
FAMILY -2.067*** -1.567** 
FAMILY_Forbes - -1.219* 
SIZE 0.824*** 0.861*** 
LEV -1.976 -2.379 
ROA 3.054 4.594 
GROWTH 0.069** 0.075** 
BOARD -1.532*** -1.586*** 
INDUSTRY   
   Basic Materials -3.706** -3.676** 
   Technology -2.437*** -2.596*** 
   
LR statistic 0.413*** 0.442*** 
McFadden R2 0.260 0.278 
The model is estimated with industry and country fixed effects. Statistically significant coefficients are presented. 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
